

Christianity and Crisis

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Queries on U. S. Policy in South and East Asia

THE AMERICAN position in South and East Asia is a complex amalgam of such constituents as these:

(1) the immediate legacy, more or less under liquidation, of the victories of 1945, as in Japan and Korea; (2) concern for peace, the natural and world-wide interest of a prosperous industrial and trading power; (3) intensification and specialization of the peace policy, defense *against* the major disturbers and aid *for* states threatened by them; (4) promotion of American economic interests and prestige, often blended with the two preceding concerns; (5) attitudes of anti-imperialism and pro-independence with reference to the non-communist states, qualified by anxieties over Communist operations in such areas as Indo-China and Malaya, and also by cooperation in European and in world affairs with the states of Western Europe which include the leading colonial powers; (6) altruistic sentiment, often associated with programs for aid and development.

These constituents of deed and policy, over-simplified here and incomplete, are natural and proper, even meritorious in many aspects of international relations. But they include conflicts not often faced as such by American opinion, which runs in generalities of resistance to communism, of avoiding atomic war, of assistance to underdeveloped areas, and the like. Just when and where does effective protection of non-communist or anti-communist areas approach militarization under American management, as in South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, or less directly in Japan? Is it possible to strengthen both India and Pakistan, notably to provide military aid for *one* of them, and yet keep the cooperation of these *two* states so deeply involved in mutual dispute? Can active aid be given in Vietnam in a manner to maintain cooperation with an effective fraction of the Vietnamese, with the government and army of France, and — on minimum terms of coexistence — with the Communists? Do extensive aid and guarantees of security in South Korea and Taiwan result in the maintenance of regimes which ill serve those countries by blocking needful change?

Lacking the efforts of the United States in East Asia since 1945, the situation would undoubtedly be

much worse for the non-communist world. But American activity appears, to important elements in Asia, to be imperialism, as Asians define that hated term redolent of centuries of European domination — the exercise of power from outside the area, interference in the affairs of Asian states. American statesmanship and public opinion ought continually and constructively to be mindful of this element in Asian attitudes, while giving due weight to others of a different bearing.

The most violent distrust and hostility comes, of course, from the Chinese Communist Party and its cousins, who are trained to identify the chief force or forces hindering expansion of their power, and to attack them relentlessly. The "neutralist" or independent attitude characteristic of India and shared in some form by several other states, is now familiar to Westerners and is better understood for its desire to be thoroughly Asian and essentially non-military. A long series of experiences and ideas lead men formed in that temper to look askance at American policy, while some of them appear to be less than alert in regard to Communist actualities.

But let us note, especially for Americans, how some particular issues look when seen from the Far East. In recent decades one power, and only one, has crashed mightily into Asia from another continent, supporting a crumbling regime in China against a rising one, and now maintaining a mere remnant of the old favorite, both in the Straits of Formosa and in the United Nations; conquering Japan and the Philippines and South Korea, and continuing as their military guardian, not without influence on the regimes or possible regimes of those areas. Okinawa is kept nakedly as an American center of control, with air and naval supplements on adjoining territories. In Vietnam, American materiel, funds, and policy have attempted to influence decisively the choice of regime. In several areas we have used air programs to exert strong influence on economic policy and trade relations within and among the Asian states. Our point here is not to argue against the purpose and the procedure of the United States in these matters, but to remind ourselves that to Asiatics of independent or critical mind this is imperialism, whether wicked or benevolent.

Such problems demand, therefore, much more than the best will and judgment that America can bring forth. They require a maximum of sympathetic, patient, steady cooperation with Asians on the spot, and with both Asian and European states in the United Nations, facing the total problems of the region as part of the world situation. No human wisdom and righteousness will know the right balance between emergency demand and long-term vision, or will be able to please all among contending parties in each state, all among contending states in the region. There can be no policy fully satisfactory and free from criticism. But these desperate difficulties make it the more necessary that American acts in Asia should be kept free from corruption by petty domestic politics, from our old vices of impatience and improvisation, from ill-considered speeches — all of which are the enemies of sound international cooperation. The best thought in our Foreign Service, in the State Department, in the groups of officers working on assistance programs of all sorts, in senatorial leadership, is creditable. Discriminating support of the better part, watchful criticism and opposition directed against the worse, are certainly required in our relationships with the Asian half of humankind.

M. S. B.

EDITORIAL NOTES

Mr. Will Herberg, whose articles have appeared in this journal, has written a book about religion in American under the title, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (Doubleday, 1955), which should make a real difference in our thinking about the American religious situation. It deals with sociological factors which underlie the present revival of religious interest and it describes very briefly the present condition of each of the "faiths." It emphasizes the fact of the revival of religious interest in a telling way. It emphasizes one pervasive tendency in American life: that almost all Americans now regard themselves as belonging to one of the three religious communities. This is their primary means of self-identification. Religion is the one element in the traditions which the various generations of immigrants have brought to this country from abroad which they were not expected to change in becoming Americans and so this now remains as their distinguishing mark. The third generation of new Americans has not inherited the tendency that was common among the second generation to rebel even against their religious traditions. This religious self-identification which has taken place in "three melting pots" — Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish — does not involve a very high level of religious commitment or of religious understanding. The fact that the revival of religious interest takes place at a time of great religious illiteracy and of moral confusion is itself a problem that calls for an explana-

tion which this book helps to provide. Mr. Herberg does not mean that people today take a personal interest in religion only because of this need for self-identification. Rather the fact of self-identification in these terms disposes them to be more open than their predecessors to the claims of the three faiths. The secular mind that is closed to the influences of church and synagogue has all but disappeared even though we cannot see much clear religious conviction resulting from those influences as yet. There is here, however, a quite extraordinary opportunity for the churches which exists in few other countries.

One surprising indication of recent changes of the the American public to religious institutions can be seen in the results of some polls conducted by Elmo Roper which Herberg quotes. In 1942 "17.5% thought that religious leaders were 'doing the most good,' as against 27.7% who put more trust in government leaders, and 18.7% in business leaders." In 1947 the relative positions of the three groups were reversed with 32.6% putting religious leaders in the highest place. In 1953 Mr. Roper found that 40% put religious leaders in the highest place (p. 64). We may discount these figures in many ways but taken together they do point to extraordinary changes in the attitude of people to organized religion. The change may often have come for the wrong reasons but even in such cases it provides an opportunity for the churches which they are hardly prepared to meet.

One of the most important features of Mr. Herberg's analysis is that he finds the vast majority of Americans take for granted that religion should take the three forms that are familiar to them. This is generally true of the Catholic laymen in spite of the exclusive claims of their church. Religious pluralism of this kind seems to be a part of the content of religion. Mr. Herberg quotes President Eisenhower as saying, "Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith — and I don't care what it is" (author's italics). He says that Eisenhower meant that he did not care whether the faith was Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. The President was not expressing religious indifference in relation to the whole gamut of religious beliefs but was merely affirming his confidence that all three faiths known to us were able to support the "moral values" and "spiritual ideals" for which Americans stand. Herberg points out how shocking this would be to Europeans. Also, there is the tendency underlying this attitude, which makes religion instrumental for the American way of life, which often becomes the real religion of Americans. Yet the general openness to the religious traditions can provide correctives for this. Here the church's temptation and opportunity are both evident. Herberg does not want the recognition of either one to cancel that of the other.

Will Herberg was the one to write this book because he is himself a Jew whose own mind is formed in large part by Protestant theology, and he is one of the few non-Catholics who have an entree in Catholic intellectual circles. Not only will readers gain

from this book remarkable illumination concerning the religious situation in America as a whole, but also most Protestant readers will gain insight that is new to them about Catholicism and Judaism.

J. C. B.

Geneva: Triumph and Tragedy

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

HISTORIANS writing a century from now may note that by the autumn of 1955 the long awaited "Meeting at the Summit" belonged to the past. They may be able to show that certain choices made by the "Big Four" led "inevitably" to success or failure in peace or war. What is denied the contemporary observer may be open to them, for perspective may allow them to show with some semblance of truth that proposals on armaments, Germany, and European security planted new seeds of conflict or of accord. Even then they will see at best through a veil darkly since the patterns of history unfold less as the causal sequences of laws of nature than as events following one another as indeterminate probabilities. Someday it may be asserted that Geneva specifically gave us either security or strife — but we can never be sure.

In the immediate present, however, the observer who tries to appraise the concrete programs pursued by the parties at Geneva is assailed by doubts and uncertainties. He knows that the establishment of alarm systems that rule out surprise attacks is a worthy goal in the cold war, but he cannot be sure that a proposal which seems on the surface to serve one side better than the other is in fact sound foreign policy. He can believe that the posture of the West as the champion of peace was clarified but yet be uneasy that our propaganda triumphs remain unmatched by commensurate diplomatic successes. He may feel that our position on German reunification was unequivocal and nonetheless be convinced that the failure to advance one single step toward a solution of the German problem invited Soviet leaders to embark seriously upon a courtship of East and West German leaders as the only suitor willing and able to pay the full price of a restored German state. In short, the answer to the wisdom or folly of specific policies put forward at Geneva is reserved for the future. We can indicate some of the possibilities and problems inherited by statesmen in the post-Geneva era, but we can hardly prove that one proposal or another was indisputably wise or foolish. This must be the task of the kind of people who discover the end of the cold war in smiles, rowboats and garden parties or, conversely, find treason in talks with an antagonist. Or it must be the course of those who are not bothered by the limited alternatives open to us in any given situation. For us it is hardly a legitimate approach a few short months after talks at the Summit.

The Triumph

We will be on safer ground if we ask: how did Geneva come about? What does it indicate about shifts of emphasis in the policies and objectives of the major powers? What can we read in the tea leaves — Mr. Khrushchev complained of the West, "They pay little attention to what we say and prefer to read tea leaves" — about Soviet capacities and intentions and, we might add, our own?

It is perhaps well to insist upon the obvious, that Geneva was something more than a few brief hours at the conference table. In broader terms it comprises a constellation of historical events. It symbolizes a convergence of various historical forces leading to a relaxation in tensions between East and West. The perseverance of Winston S. Churchill, who as early as the Fulton Speech began calling for a meeting at the highest level, cannot be overlooked. To this must be added the courage of Western leaders, oftentimes persecuted and shamefully maligned, who shaped policies to create more favorable situations of strength. Indeed the preconditions for Geneva and for the Austrian Peace Treaty were probably the Marshall Plan, NATO and Korea. They may also include prosperity in the West and the adherence by Western Germany to NATO. An awareness that men held in their hands the means of destroying the human race coupled with the rise of a new post-revolutionary generation in Russia increased the demands for a conference of some sort. Of Stalins' successors and the new Soviet leaders, the late Mayor Reuter of Berlin observed in the spring of 1953: They differ from the old Bolshevik revolutionaries. They pay only lip service to revolutionary ideals. They know what war has cost them and their country and want merely to develop it in peace, make money and enjoy greater material pleasures. They appear less as crusaders, conspirators or adventurers. If Mayor Reuter was right, and we know that revolutionary zeal almost never outlives the first generation of revolutionists, this doubtless contributed to Geneva. The Russians also face the problem of running a dictatorship without a dictator. What Premier Bulganin called "The unbending will of the peoples for peace" was important. These factors plus the moderation and willingness of the Eisenhower Administration to "go anywhere if it helped the chances for peace" made Geneva possible. Premier Faure of France observed, "For ten years no analogous con-

ference has been held among heads of government." There may be reasons for doubting that this event or the other paved the way for the conference but one thing is clear. It marked the end of what had been a moratorium on discussions among Western heads of state and the Soviet Prime Minister. Perhaps the greatest triumph of Geneva is the fact it occurred.

If we turn to an assessment of the aims and intentions of the major powers and possible changes in their goals the picture is more cloudy. For one thing discussions were frequently at a level of generality, if not sentimentalism, that seemed to leave the real issues unexplored. For example, President Eisenhower proclaimed, "There are no territorial conflicts or commercial rivalries" between us, and Premier Bulganin echoed these words. Then too, Soviet policy with its phases of advance and retreat has become a byword for inscrutability. However Soviet aims are not unrelated to its capacities and it may be noteworthy that in some spheres the Soviet economy has shown signs of increasing strain. For instance, one competent observer has written, "The perennial food shortage has not been met. Livestock is still below Czarist levels. Industry, too, cannot fulfill all the economy's insistent demands. Promised consumer goods production has been curtailed." While it was probably unwise for State Department officials to proclaim that the Soviet Union was leading from weakness, the Russians may have been made more conciliatory by pressures on the domestic scene.

The best one can say is that objective conditions both external and internal invited the quest for an improved international atmosphere. It is clear that ultimate Soviet purposes from the standpoint of doctrine at least remain substantially the same, nor ought we to suppose that our task has been made any easier by the recent spate of conviviality. Professor Niebuhr has observed, "the evidence multiplies that we are dealing with a foe who is no less resolute because he has become more flexible and full of guile."

Geneva to be sure was something less than the acid test of Soviet and Western intentions. On the one hand, it was conceived of as first and foremost a confrontation, an opportunity for great antagonists to meet face to face and perhaps discover thereby a new atmosphere in international relations. For Mr. Churchill, one purpose had been that "there might be a general feeling among those gathered together that they might do something better than tear the human race, including themselves, into bits . . . At worst, the participants in the meeting will have established more intimate contacts." On the other hand, neither side showed a serious willingness to negotiate on the issues that have so painfully divided this unhappy postwar world. The Russians, as might have been expected, showed no desire to see the two Germanies united by free and early elections. They preferred to tie any German solution to a European security treaty providing for

NATO's dissolution after three years. More important they indicated their aim to deal separately with the two Germanies — a goal that now seems to be within reach. The topsy-turvy character of international politics is illustrated by the apparent shift in tactics in the German policies of East and West. The Soviet Union, which has sometimes posed as a champion of reunification, favored at Geneva the maintenance of the status quo bluntly opposing reunification at least for the time being. The West, and in particular the British and the French, put Germany on the forefront by proposing that it be partially demilitarized and that a system of arms control be imposed upon parts of Germany and its neighbors. Turnabouts are of course commonplace when dictated by the interests of states, and since 1947 every tactical move affecting Germany has been designed to prevent its full identification with one side or the other in the cold war. It is nevertheless ironic that the parties to discussions at Geneva appeared on the German question to be reading from one another's scripts of a few months back.

The triumph of Geneva then escapes us if we look to substantive results. Of course, from the start the world's leaders publicly asserted that problems of a generation could hardly be solved overnight, even though at times they struck a quite extravagant pose. Probably because of the buoyancy of some of his remarks at the conference, President Eisenhower upon his return felt constrained to say, "We must never be deluded into believing that one week of friendly, even fruitful, negotiation can wholly eliminate a problem arising out of the gulf that separates, so far, East and West." If the President merits praise, it is for this personal leadership and the confidence it inspires. At Geneva he seemed bent on reassuring the Russians and the rest of the world that the West thought only of peace. Professor Bennett has well said: "It would be hard for the most critical to avoid being impressed by the President's passion for peace, by his eagerness to believe the best of the Russians, by his warm friendliness, by his willingness to go all out to get results at Geneva." At home the example of his moderation has been contagious; abroad it may have bolstered our flagging prestige. At Geneva more than in Washington the President appeared to rule and not merely to reign. Perhaps it is his personal triumph that a new course of seeming amity and goodwill has been chartered with great publicity. It will be impossible to hold that course for long, however, unless there is agreement on something as, sad to tell, there was not at the Palais des Nations.

The Tragic Aspects of Geneva

Our fascination at the effects of the President's charisma and his charming amiability ought not to blind us to the shortcomings and more tragic aspects of the conference. Neither in its conduct nor in the content of the proposals advanced was it an unqualified

success. Neither side numbered among its riches a plethora of new and imaginative ideas. Indeed, on the first day of the conference one commentator noted that: "The United States Government has not completed its interdepartmental studies on the question of any new agreement with the Soviet Union on Germany and a general security system for Europe." Despite the acclaim accorded the President's scheme for aerial inspection, its patrimony, whether military or civilian, goes back at least to 1946 or 1947. It had been tried out twice before with less than spectacular success. It was advanced again in what was allegedly a new and more hopeful context. Some critics maintain that it is a sign of the essential bankruptcy of the current American approach to great power talks that this "warmed over" recipe for what ails the world should be trumpeted abroad with such exuberance and acclaim. As James Reston pointed out, one could hardly imagine a political design less likely to excite our foe. The first law of successful diplomacy is that for every quid there must be a quo. But the Russians already have access through intelligence and the Western free press to much of the essential information regarding American military installations and deployment. We in turn are lacking in our knowledge about the Russians, at least in point of degree and, therefore, it is not by accident that our military and psychological warriors saw advantage in the President's plan. They saw in it a handmaiden in their tasks while others were less enthusiastic. In response to critics, the Administration has argued that it has no pride of authorship and its proposal has from the beginning been "negotiable." Perhaps this might be possible if the question of armaments controls had been placed in a political and territorial setting, but it is puzzling to know how a bargain can be struck when what we offer is already substantially within the grasp of our antagonist. In other words, if our maximum inducement is not appealing, it is hard to see how a lesser offering can bring results. This assumes of course that the trouble with the President's plan is its disregard of Russian interests but as Mr. Reston pointed out, the scheme has its defects no less on this side of the Atlantic. There are questions of constitutionality, practicality and enforceability which are as serious for us as for the Russians. In short, the President's design may have won us another moral and propaganda victory but the state of the cold war was left almost precisely where it was. The arms race is a symptom, not a cause, of world tensions and the present administration knows this as well as its predecessor. Yet the tragedy of Geneva was that the West, fearing that Soviet diplomats with their "new look" would seize the propaganda initiative, chose its own substitute for the announced policy of slow modifications in a continuing cold war. Having chosen it, "official spokesmen, who were the sole source of the news, played up the smiles and minimized the differences of substance, with the result that the official

line has had to be changed once more to try to bring things back into a little better proportion."

The tendency to treat problems from a perch above the clouds antedates the meetings themselves. Upon the eve of his departure for Geneva, the President spoke through the medium of television to millions of earnest and devoted citizens. Few national leaders in office have had such an opportunity to talk sense to the American people. The President might have explained the hard facts of the cold war. Instead he chose a rhetoric of resounding moralisms and glittering generalities. He had nothing to say about peaceful change, about Germany or about the present military stalemate — a condition which has meant we can be successful in containing Soviet expansion but are unable to roll back its sphere of influence. As Walter Lippmann has noted, we can "defend South Korea and Formosa against overt aggression, but we cannot drive the Communists out of North Korea or the Chinese mainland. We can defend West Germany and West Berlin, but we cannot compel the Soviets to withdraw from East Germany and East Berlin." Yet so long as the Red Army stands at the heart of Europe, peace will be precarious and insecure. A change must be brought about, but with the total annihilative power of modern weapons and the existing balance of power, neither side can induce the other to yield to its will. If change occurs it can come only through diplomacy and negotiations, or by the passing of time and the emergence of new military and political situations. Faced with a stalemate, we must somehow discover the grounds for an agreement based on the mutual self-interests of both sides. Of this truth, the Administration cannot possibly be oblivious or unmindful. Yet the President has been unwilling or unable to express these simple truths. As Mr. Lippmann concludes: "The President would prepare the country for what is coming if he explained . . . what negotiations means. He would then come down out of the clouds of those brave abstract principles and down on to the hard earth where we must live with and deal with the Soviet Union. . . . It is no good allowing Mr. Nixon to talk as if we could get everything for nothing merely by blowing our own horn loudly enough. That can do nothing but mislead our own people."

If the President's approach had partaken more of this quality of wisdom and realism, the words of his critics respecting his use of religion in politics would have lost most of their sting. No one can but be thankful that we have a leader who fearlessly affirms his personal faith. But Mr. Eisenhower aside, as the pages of this little journal attest, the informed Christian is surprised to find himself painfully ambivalent about recent increases in high places of religious utterances. From a period of neglect or cynicism about religious truths with a relevance for public life, the common practice today has become one of substituting pious homilies for social and political lessons. Lincoln

was able to impose high truths upon harsh conditions primarily because he confronted man's misery no less than his grandeur. Because we can feel the deep anguish and suffering in his words, we are persuaded by his prayers for a strength that is greater than his own. This quality is lacking in much of our contemporary discourse not because men are less devout but because a religious pragmatism which is essential to our economic and political life has penetrated our spiritual citadels. Yet we know that God is either more than an errand boy on the highway to social and material success or he is not God. Before he can serve us, he must judge us in our partial and fragmentary virtues; through his love, his justice can sweeten our judgments and his mercy temper our passions. But in leaving to us free choice and social responsibility, he asks the best of our minds and hearts with the intellectual and moral resources at our command. The German words in the inscription framed above the desk of Nobel prizewinner Otto Hahn read in translation, "God give me unclouded eyes and freedom from haste. God give me quiet and relentless anger against all pretense and all pretentious work and all work left slack and unfinished. God give me a restlessness whereby I may neither sleep nor accept praise until my observed results equal my calculated results, or, in pious glee, I discover and assault my error. God give me strength not to trust to God." These words of the author of *Arrowsmith*, Dr. Hahn has said, sum "up the scientist's credo better than I ever could." Perhaps if these words on man's duties in proximate matters are placed in the context of an awareness of man's final dependence and helplessness before God, they can also provide a motto for statesmen and diplomats.

If we return to Geneva, the conduct of the conference had few of the qualities conceived of originally as essential to a "Meeting at the Summit." Mr. Churchill had urged that its procedures be marked "with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion." Since one aim was the establishment of more intimate contacts, he urged that the leaders be freed from the tyranny of prepared statements, verbatim records and public positions that became frozen. They should rather be encouraged by every means to let their hair down and explain without fear or favor the essence of national interests and problems. As to the ordering of the discussions, Mr. Churchill had counseled, "This conference should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda, or led into mazes or jungles of technical details, zealously contested by hordes of experts and officials drawn up in vast, cumbrous array."

In fact, it has been charged that the conference was marked by a denial of Mr. Churchill's philosophy in almost every particular. It had its agenda, prepared statements, frozen positions and hordes of experts. It was in effect a conference of the "Big Forty," not the "Big Four." Statements on delicate and complex political problems as well as on technical details were released by press officers more accustomed to the

requirements of national political conventions than the imperatives of the international arena. The amount of serious negotiations which went on is reflected not only in the barrenness of the present public record, but in the alacrity with which the State Department was prompted to ask that the minutes of the closed sessions be released. There was a curious disparity between the rigid formality in diplomatic procedures and arrangements and the reckless abandon displayed by old soldiers in friendly and cordial reunion. It was almost as if we had trusted our Chief Executive in playful camaraderie but been unwilling to accord him discretion in conduct of the affairs of state. Before the conference it was proposed by a veteran American observer, "it is generally agreed that a measure of secrecy ought to be permitted about the details of preparation, exchanges of views, and day-by-day discussions. This is a buffer against the warping effect of willful partisan controversy. It may improve the chance for each Government to find out the ideas and aims of the others. It allows candor in discussion between them by lessening political risks. It can provide a better atmosphere for reconciliation of differences." No one can say without more knowledge than we now possess in what ways these issues were recognized at Geneva. But with the dour Scotsman one can, with some reason, have his doubts.

A Balance Sheet

The theme of volume six in Mr. Churchill's great history of the Second World War is "Triumph and Tragedy." He explains that what he had in mind was "How the Great Democracies Triumphed, and so Were able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." It is plainly too early to prophesy whether Geneva was an event of another order than this melancholy procession of events. Its principal aim was to create a new spirit which might make possible future solutions of problems. The meeting next month of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva may throw further light on this question. The issues which will be discussed or have been considered already are not clear and simple matters to judge. The essence of a diplomatic bargain is that something gained here must be really worth something given up there. Up to now there has been no bargain or adjustment; some believe it might come in the second or third phases of talks with the Russians. For example, one means of seeking to disengage the Red Army from Central Europe could be "the reunification of Germany by free elections and the fixing of limits upon its right to armed forces. . . . [as] the starting point for a wider scheme." In such a scheme, any limits or withdrawal of Western power would demand a corresponding Soviet retreat. Once established the plan could provide a more viable framework for a European security system to which Soviet leaders have recently given highest priority. If extended to the Far East, it might contribute a more enduring safeguard to peace than either Mr. Nehru's five principles of

coexistence or the present workings of SEATO. Perhaps the Russians will balk at the logic of such an approach, or the Germans will take matters into their own hands. It would have been well if Geneva had produced some form of mutual reinsurance guarantee touching Germany. However, the heart of Europe still provides a testing ground for armaments control. If this goal were attainable in subsequent talks, the critics of Geneva would be silenced and all of us would join in praising those who "meet at the Summit."

CHURCH NEWS AND NOTES

Rockefeller Gift Makes W.C.C. Study Possible

A gift of \$260,000 from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to the World Council of Churches, will make it possible to carry on an international study and appraisal of Christian responsibility in areas of rapid social change — notably in countries of Asia and Africa — during the coming three years. (See issue of September 19.)

Announcement of the gift was made September 17 by the Geneva and New York offices of the World Council of Churches. Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert is Executive Secretary of the New York office at 156 Fifth Avenue and of the Friends of the World Council of Churches, Inc., the legal corporation through which the gift was made. Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft is General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, Geneva.

Director of the World Council's Study Division, which will direct the study, is Dr. Robert S. Bilheimer, of New York, who was the Executive for the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches which met in Evanston, Illinois, last year. He is now an Associate General Secretary of the World Council with offices in Geneva, Switzerland. The Assembly created the Division of Studies, with Dr. Bilheimer as its head, to coordinate ecumenical studies in the fields of Christian unity, the responsibility of the churches in social and international problems, and evangelism. The Study Division defines its task as "to arouse Christian thinking and action in regard to issues of world import, about which there is not sufficient clarity or unity of thought." It aims to carry out its program through international and interdenominational consultations, conferences, regional study commissions, team visitations and publications.

The gift from Mr. Rockefeller includes grants for the following purposes:

1. For the special study of the Christian responsibility in areas of "rapid social change," especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is the main project of the Division of Studies for the next three years.
2. For other study projects in the field of the Unity of the Church, the World Mission of the Church and Christianity and War.
3. For housing accommodations for the staff of the Ecumenical Institute at Chateau de Bossey. The Ecumenical Institute was established ten years ago with the help of an initial gift from Mr. Rockefeller, as a center of conferences, retreats and studies in the interest of world-wide Christian cooperation and service.

Mr. Rockefeller's present gift is designed, in part, to complete the physical equipment for the Ecumenical Institute.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editors:

Surely Bishop William Scarlett is aware that services of open communion were celebrated at the First and Second Assemblies at Amsterdam and Evanston. Not *one* service, of course, which brings me to my point. I am bothered by the feeling implicit in the article "That Communion May Be Open," July 11, that open Communion is a "common celebration," a "united service of Holy Communion," a "deed of unity." This is not the case, I believe. The Report of the Third World Conference of Faith and Order, at Lund, 1952, defines Open Communion as "where a Church on principle invites members of other Churches to receive communion when they are present at its communion services, e.g., the Methodist, Congregationalist, and most of the Reformed Churches" (p. 39). The Churches invited do not necessarily accept the invitation. Is not the call, rather, "That We May Be In Communion With Each Other," intercommunion?

It seems to me that the deep-rooted problem is that of *intercommunion*, not to be resolved at ecumenical gatherings until the member Churches of the World Council have established communion between themselves. This is not a matter of church delegates to an assembly deciding to participate in the "open" service of communion celebrated by bishops of the Church of South India, or (and) in the "open" Anglican service; it is not just a matter of the Church of England extending the invitation to *their* celebration of the sacrament. Intercommunion, and the related problem of intercelebration strike far deeper.

Sincerely yours,
Beverly Lindholm
New York, N. Y.

To the Editors:

How subtly your contributor, Andre Philip ("Franco-American Relations," issue of July 25) passes over America's chief gripe against France, namely her antiquated colonial system! Did he fail to observe how extremely embarrassing it has been for us both to befriend France and to stand for our traditional freedom in Asia at the same time? When is France going to grow up?

Roderick Scott
Olivet College
Olivet, Michigan

To the Editors:

I am surprised to read from time to time in the pages of *Christianity and Crisis* comments and assertions which would seem to indicate a lack of accuracy on the part of the writer.

In the August 8th issue I find a flagrant example of this lack of accuracy on page 111. The author

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states: "The upholding of Judge Youngdahl by the Court of Appeals in the Lattimore case and the dropping of that case by the government has helped to clear the air. It has also shown how easy it is for the government to persecute by making charges that undermine a man's career and by imposing upon him the cost of years of litigation. . ."

In those two short sentences there are four glaring misstatements, as follows:

1) The Court of Appeals did not uphold Judge Youngdahl in the Lattimore case. It voted 4 to 4 on the Youngdahl ruling. Thus it was a tie vote, which neither rejected nor upheld the ruling.

2) The case was dropped by the government because Attorney General Brownell knew that Youngdahl (a Truman appointee) would favor Lattimore in the forthcoming trial, regardless of what evidence the government produced to prove Lattimore a conscious promoter of communism. The dropping of the case did not lift the black cloud of treason from Lattimore's head, nor did it clear the air of suspicions regarding his activities and associations.

3) A group of Reds and pro-Reds in Maryland and Washington got up a defense fund for Lattimore, which paid all his expenses and probably more beside. Fortas, Arnold and Porter, his attorneys, donated their services. So it is far from the truth to say that Lattimore was burdened with the "cost of years of litigation."

4) To say that the Lattimore case was an instance of persecution by the government is a wanton distortion of truth.

The stenographic reports of Lattimore's testimony before the McCarran committee will prove to any reasonable person that Lattimore lied over and over again under oath — not just seven times as the government contended — but seven times seven. His testimony is studded with dodgings, evasions, weasel maneuvers, and outright falsehoods. His attitude toward an important government committee was viciously hostile and maliciously mean and belligerent. As Bernard Baruch recently said, in commenting on the outrageous behavior of Communists of the entertainment world, who recently dodged behind the 5th amendment to cover their guilt: "No innocent man needs to lie, evade or hide behind the Fifth Amendment. . ."

If I had space I could list 250 proofs of Lattimore's close and intimate affiliation with the Communist conspiracy. His books were praised, recommended and advertised in the pages of the Daily Worker. A Soviet espionage agent was his intimate friend and twice boosted him into vital governmental jobs.

So one might go on. The evidence against Lattimore is monumental. Like Alger Hiss, while employed by the United States government, he betrayed his trust by aiding a criminal conspiracy in its effort to destroy that government. How can you, in good conscience, a Christian publication, throw the weight of your support to persons who would, if they could, destroy the entire edifice of Christianity and along with it the precious freedoms we enjoy as Americans, themselves rooted in the ideals of Christianity?

Very sincerely yours,
Vincent G. Burns
Annapolis, Maryland

We print this letter as a sample of a type of opinion which is still present in this country. We cannot do so without, first of all, repudiating the insinuations about Judge Youngdahl and about Truman appointees. The author makes reckless charges about the raising of defense funds. Actually we know that such funds were raised among people concerned about civil liberties. Even if Lattimore was helped in this way, the kind of financial risk that attends "years of litigation" remains a serious thing and, in less publicized cases, it can be a crushing burden. Our chief point was that charges supported by government which later have to be dropped can be a form of persecution. We hold no brief for some of Lattimore's opinions or for some of his associations but these all belonged to a period of history in which issues were less clear than they are today. The whole case was tried before the Senate Committee and in the press in an atmosphere created by McCarthy's charges against Lattimore which went so far beyond anything that the government attempted to prove. Even the indictment for perjury could not be made to stick despite the heavy pressure upon him in the examination which induced some wobbling statements. Though there is room for honest differences of opinion about Lattimore and his role, we should be able to rejoice together that we have had such good evidence in recent months of the integrity of the courts and of the way in which they defend the rights of persons in the face of the power of government.

J. C. B.

Author in this Issue

Dr. Kenneth W. Thompson is professor of International Relations at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.

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